Recently, attribute-based keyword search (ABKS) schemes have been used to provide finegrained search over encrypted data on eHealth cloud in the Internet of Things (IoT) platforms. As compared to conventional public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) schemes, ABKS schemes provide more powerful and flexible search operations which allow encrypted data to be retrieved by multiple users that satisfy set of attributes. However, there are still some limitations and security issues on the existing ABKS schemes. Many of the existing ABKS schemes only support for the encryption of keyword and require a separate cryptographic primitive to encrypt the message. Also, most of the schemes cannot resist offline keyword guessing attacks by inside attackers (i.e., the honest-but-curious servers). A secure-channel is needed for most of the ABKS schemes to transmit the trapdoors between the server and receivers. To solve these problems, we propose a secure-channel free ciphertext-policy decryptable attribute-based keyword search (CP-DABKS) scheme. The proposed scheme allows the authorised user who satisfy the access structure to decrypt the ciphertext. Our scheme not only resists the insider keyword guessing attack, but also eliminates the secure channel for trapdoor transmission. We formally define and prove the security of the proposed CP-DABKS scheme. We also demonstrate its application on an eHealth cloud platform.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of internet technology, cloud platforms have widely been used for different applications due to its powerful storage and computing capabilities. Users from different physical locations can share resources by uploading data in the cloud platforms [1] . Data collected from various IoT (Internet of Things) sensors and devices are sent to the cloud for processing and analysis. In health care applications, electronic health records (EHRs) are stored in cloud to facilitate the sharing of EHRs among various medical practitioners in different departments or areas. These EHRs may also contain readings and measurements collected by wearable The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Sara Pizzi . devices or body sensors of patients. Such new sharing mode of EHRs is more convenient and efficient as compared to the traditional mode. But, it also raises the issues of data confidentiality and privacy [2] as cloud service providers (CSPs) are not completely trusted. Honest-but-curious CSPs may be able to obtain some valuable information even though they perform the functions honestly. Therefore, how to protect the privacy and confidentiality of data is a major security concern in eHealth cloud environments.
In order to protect the confidentiality of data, EHRs are usually encrypted before uploading to the cloud platforms. However, it is challenging for a medical practitioner to retrieve encrypted EHRs based on certain keywords or criteria associated to the encrypted documents. The notion of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) was first VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ proposed by Boneh et al. in 2004 [3] to solve the problem of searching on encrypted documents. In a PEKS application for cloud storage of EHRs, a data sender encrypts the keyword w associated to the encrypted EHRs, and uploads the keyword ciphertext along with the encrypted EHRs to the cloud server. A data receiver, who wants to retrieve the EHRs containing the keyword w, generates a trapdoor T w of the keyword and sends it to the cloud server. The cloud server can use this trapdoor T w to test whether it matches any of the stored keyword ciphertexts for the receiver. If there is a match, the cloud server successfully finds the encrypted EHR containing the keyword w and returns it to the receiver. The cloud server should learn nothing else about the keyword. This security property is called indistinguishability against chosen keyword attack (IND-CKA). Most of the PEKS schemes are considered as one-to-one communication which only allow a single authorised user to retrieve encrypted data shared by a data sender. Another type of attack against PEKS schemes is the off-line keyword guessing attack (KGA) [4] , [5] . Specifically, an attacker can guess each possible keywords and verify the correctness of his/her guesses by exploiting the weaknesses of some PEKS schemes and its variants [6] , [7] . This is possible as the keyword space in PEKS schemes and its variants is small and can be exhaustively tried by the attacker. There are typically two types of attackers considered in PEKS schemes, namely outside and inside attackers. Outsider attackers are malicious outsiders who launch attacks against PEKS systems based on keyword ciphertexts or trapdoors obtained in a public channel. Inside attackers are malicious insiders, i.e., the server, which may launch attacks based on the results of running the test function in addition to keyword ciphertexts and trapdoors received from the senders and receivers. Based on these two types of attackers, keyword guessing attacks are generally categorised into outside and inside KGAs.
The concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE) was first proposed by Sahai and Waters [8] in 2005. In an ABE system, encrypted data can be shared by multiple users with certain set of attributes (i.e., enabling one-to-many encryption). Specifically, a sender can control the access of encrypted documents based on the attributes of the receivers. Only users who satisfy all the attributes can decrypt the encrypted documents. Considering the flexibility of searching on finegrained sharing of encrypted data, many variants of attributebased keyword search (ABKS) schemes that combine PEKS with ABE have been proposed since then [9] - [20] .
To solve the security issues and limitations of the existing ABKS schemes, we propose a secure-channel free ciphertext-policy decryptable attribute-based keyword search (CP-DABKS) scheme. Our scheme resists KGAs and does not require a secure channel to transmit the trapdoor generated by a user. The proposed scheme can be applied to a telemedicine system as shown in Fig. 1 . Telemedicine is the delivery of health care services through information and communication technology in two or more separate locations. Medical practitioners use the underlying technology platform to exchange medical and clinical information for the benefits of individual patients and communities. Long-distance diagnosis, treatment and counseling are provided to the injured and sick in rural or suburban areas that lack of health care services.
A large number of electronic health records are stored in the telemedicine cloud server. Our proposed CP-DABKS scheme is applied to enable the cloud server for protecting the confidentiality of the EHRs as well as providing finegrained access control. Consider a patient who lives in a rural area A of Province B. When he/she is admitted to a local hospital with limited medical resources, he/she may wants to receive better medical treatment via telemedicine. For this example, the patient or the local hospital is the data sender. If he/she has a knee problem, the keyword associated to the plaintext message to be sent is ''orthopaedic disorder''. The plaintext message may include the patient's age, sex, health history, as well as readings obtained from the patient's wearable devices or body sensors. The access structure can be set up based on which medical centers or physicians should access the patient's health records. For example, only large telemedicine hospitals satisfying three conditions can access them, which are >5 years of telemedicine experience, orthopaedic department, province B. The patient or the local hospital uploads the encrypted keywords and access structure as well as ciphertext of health records to the telemedicine cloud platform.
The medical practitioners in the primary medical centers at national or regional level are the data receivers. The medical centers may have attributes, such as department (e.g., orthopaedic, dermatology, ophthalmology, etc.), geographical location (e.g., province B), telemedicine experience (e.g., >5 years), and so on. The data receiver sends the trapdoor of ''orthopaedic disorder'' and the encrypted attribute secret key to the telemedicine cloud server.
When the telemedicine cloud server receives the trapdoor, the cloud server can determine whether the attributes of the medical centers meet the needs of the patient.
Subsequently, the server can sends the encrypted EHRs to the requested medical center based on the test results of keyword ciphertext and trapdoor. After that, the patient may receive the treatment from the medical practitioner in the medical center remotely on the telemedicine platform.
Our contributions in this paper are summarised as follows:
• We present an attribute-based keyword search scheme that integrates the encryption of both keyword and plaintext message. By adopting an efficient LSSS (Linear Secret Sharing Scheme) access policy, our scheme supports multi-user keyword retrieval.
• We introduce the cloud server's public and private keys to eliminate the secure channel in trapdoor transmission process. Taking advantage of the computation and storage capabilities of cloud servers, our scheme enables the cloud server to perform some related operations, including keyword retrieval and partial ciphertext decryption.
• Our scheme has strong security. Even when the cloud server is a malicious attacker, our scheme can resist chosen plaintext attack (CPA), chosen keyword attack (CKA) and off-line keyword guessing attack (KGA). The rest of the paper is organised as follows:
In Section II, we review the literature related to this paper. In Section III, we review bilinear maps, access structure, linear secret sharing scheme, and some underlying assumptions. In Section IV, we present the definition and security models of our proposed CP-DABKS scheme. In Section V, we present the construction of the proposed CP-DABKS scheme and show its correctness. In Section VI, we present the security proof. In Section VII, we compare our scheme with some ABKS schemes in the literature. We conclude our work in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In 2014, Boneh et al. [3] proposed the first public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme for searching on encrypted data. However, the transmission of the trapdoor in Boneh et al.'s PEKS scheme [3] requires a secure channel which is inefficient. Subsequently, Baek et al. [21] proposed a secure-channel free PEKS (SCF-PEKS) scheme by encrypting the keyword using public keys of both server and receiver. In 2009, Rhee et al. [22] presented a PEKS scheme with designated tester and strengthened the security model in [21] . But, the schemes in [21] and [22] are only provably secure in the random oracle model. Later, SCF-PEKS schemes that are secure in the standard model were proposed by Fang et al. [23] , [24] . Rhee et al. [25] proposed the concept of trapdoor indistinguishability and showed that if a scheme satisfies trapdoor indistinguishability, the scheme can resist off-line keyword guessing attacks. The schemes in [25] - [27] resist outside off-line keyword guessing attack based on trapdoor indistinguishability. In 2017 Huang and Li [28] adopted the idea of authenticated encryption to resist inside keyword guessing attacks. However, [28] still needs a secure channel in trapdoor transmission process. Recently, the PEKS schemes proposed in [29] -[31] also adopted similar idea by including a data sender's private key in the generation of keyword ciphertexts to solve the problem of inside keyword guessing attacks. Lattice-based schemes proposed in [32] and [33] employed preimage sampleable function to generate the authenticated keyword ciphertexts for resisting inside KGAs.
Goyal et al. [34] defined ABE in two forms: ciphertextpolicy ABE (CP-ABE) and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE). In a CP-ABE system, the ciphertext is associated with the access policy and the secret key contains attributes. The decryption operation can be executed only if the attributes of secret key satisfy the access policy associated with the ciphertext. In a KP-ABE system, the secret key is associated with the access policy and ciphertext contains attributes. The KP-ABE ciphertext can only be decrypted if the attributes of the ciphertext satisfy the access policy associated with the secret key. Many ABE schemes [35] - [39] have been proposed.
In 2014, Sun et al. [10] proposed an attribute-based keyword search scheme that supports user revocation. The user revocation tasks can be delegated to a cloud server by using proxy re-encryption and lazy re-encryption techniques which reduce the computation loads of a data owner's system. Li et al. [11] proposed an attribute-based PEKS scheme based on KP-ABE with a low efficient tree access policy. Miao et al. [12] proposed an attribute-based multikeyword search scheme based on CP-ABE. Their scheme supports for searching on encrypted personal health records in multi-owner setting. He et al. [15] presented a conjunctive keyword search scheme in hybrid cloud environment based on CP-ABE. In the keyword index generation of the He et al.'s scheme [15] , a data owner only generates intermediate parameter and sends it to a private cloud to complete the generation of keyword index. Yin et al. [17] also proposed a ciphertext-policy attribute-based keyword search scheme based on CP-ABE of [35] . Cui et al. [19] applied online/offline techniques to construct both ciphertext-policy and key-policy attribute-based keyword search schemes. Their proposed schemes enable cloud servers to perform most of the decryption operation in order to reduce the computation at the mobile client device. All the above attribute-based keyword search schemes only consider the encryption of keywords, but do not cover the encryption and decryption of messages. Those ABKS schemes require to use a separate approach (e.g., a symmetric encryption) for the message encryption.
Wang et al. [9] proposed a ciphertext-policy attributebased encryption scheme with keyword search function (KSF-CP-ABE) which uses a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) access matrix. The encryption algorithm in the KSF-CP-ABE scheme covers both keyword and message encryptions. However, Wang et al. did not give rigorous security proofs for their proposed scheme. Yang et al. [13] proposed an attribute-keyword based data publish-subscribe (AKPS) scheme for cloud systems. They also pointed out that users may break the security of the Wang et. al.'s scheme [9] by obtaining the master secret key of the system. Miao et al. [14] presented ABKS schemes that support searching on hierarchical data. Cao et al. [16] proposed a lightweight ABKS system that is suitable for fine-grained searching on sensor data collected from wireless body area networks. Miao et al. [18] proposed an ABKS system (basic ABKS-SM) with hidden access policy that supports shared multi-owner setting. They also presented another modified ABKS-SM system that supports tracing of dishonest data users. A multi-authority ABKS (MABKS) system was proposed in [20] to overcome the limitations of traditional single-authority ABKS schemes. All the ABKS schemes in [14] , [16] , [18] , [20] include data encryption and decryption with the use of a symmetric encryption scheme. However, only [18] claims the security against off-line KGAs. Very recently, Sun et al. [40] showed that the ABKS-SM scheme [18] is susceptible to four types of off-line KGAs.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We first present some notations used throughout this paper. For a prime p, Z p denotes the set {0, 1, · · · , p − 1}, and Z * p denotes Z p \{0}. For a finite set S, x ∈ R S denotes a randomly selected element x from S with a uniform distribution.
A. BILINEAR PAIRINGS
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of prime order p, and let g be a generator of G 1 . e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear pairing if satisfying the following properties:
• (Computability) ∀g, h ∈ G 1 , there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g, h).
B. ACCESS STRUCTURE
Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n } be a set of parties. A collection A ⊆ 2 P is monotone. For ∀B, C, when B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C ∈ A. An access structure is a collection (respectively, monotone collection) A which is made up of non-empty subsets of P, i.e. A ⊆ 2 P \ {∅}. The sets in A are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets.
C. LINEAR SECRET SHARING SCHEME
A secret-sharing scheme over a set of parties P is a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) in Z p if:
1) The shares for each party form a vector in Z p .
2) There exists a matrix M with l rows and n columns which called the share-generating matrix for . For the i'th row of M (i = 1, . . . , l), we define the party labeling row i as ρ(i). It can construct the column vector v = (s, r 2 , . . . , r n ), where s ∈ Z p is the secret to be shared, and r 2 , . . . , r n ∈ Z p are randomly chosen. If {λ i = (M v) i } are valid shares of any secret, there exists constants
Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear pairing and g be a generator in G 1 . Given (g, g x , g y , g z ) ∈ G 1 , where x, y, z are random elements in Z * p . For any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A that solves the problem of computing e(g, g) xyz , we define the advantage function Adv CBDH
The CBDH problem is said to be intractable if Adv CBDH
Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear pairing and g be a generator in G 1 . Given (g, g x , g y , g z ) ∈ G 1 , where x, y, z are random elements in Z * p . For any PPT adversary A that tries to distinguish e(g, g) xyz ∈ G 2 from a random element Z ∈ G 2 , we define the advantage function Adv DBDH [41] Given g, g y , g s/y ∈ G 1 , where y, s are random elements in Z * p . For any PPT adversary A that tries to distinguish g s from a random element Z ∈ G 1 , we define the advantage function
The DDDH problem is said to be intractable if Adv DDDH G 1 ,A (k) is negligible. It is easy to find a reduction from the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem (Given g a , g b , g ab , Z ∈ G 1 , distinguish g ab from Z , where a, b are randomly chosen from Z * p ) to DDDH problem [41] in groups without pairings. [38] Let (p, G 1 , G 2 , g, e) be a description of the bilinear group of prime order p. If an adversary A is given
. . , g a q , . . . , g a 2q ,
g is a generator in G 1 , A tries to distinguish e(g, g) a q+1 s from the random element Z ∈ G 2 . The advantage function Adv The decisional q-parallel BDHE problem is said to be intractable if Adv
IV. CIPHERTEXT-POLICY DECRYPTABLE ATTRIBUTE-BASED KEYWORD SEARCH (CP-DABKS) A. DEFINITION OF CP-DABKS
A ciphertext policy attribute-based decryptable keyword search system (as shown in Fig. 2) consists of four entities, namely key generation center (KGC), data sender, data receiver with some attributes, and cloud server.
• Key generation center: The key generation center is responsible for the establishment of global system parameters and the generation of public-private key pairs and attribute secret keys for data receivers. We consider KGC as a trusted party in this system.
• Data sender: The data sender is the owner of the data who wants to share his/her data with data receivers with certain attributes. He/She sets the keyword and access structure associated with the data. He/She then encrypts data, keyword, and access structure and uploads the ciphertext to the cloud server.
• Data receiver: The data receiver has certain attributes (e.g., position, department, etc.) for retrieving the data stored in the cloud server. He/She generates a trapdoor for the keyword associated with the data and sends it to the cloud server. Upon receiving the ciphertext sent by the cloud server, the data receiver decrypts the ciphertext and recovers the plaintext data shared by the data sender.
• Cloud server: The cloud server is responsible to store the encrypted data uploaded by the data sender and search the encrypted data on behalf of the data receiver. Upon receiving the trapdoor from the data receiver, the cloud server runs a test function to determine whether the receiver's attributes satisfy the access structure of the stored ciphertext for him/her. It also tests if the keyword trapdoor matches keyword ciphertext. If the match is successful, the cloud server sends the corresponding ciphertext to the user. During the process, the cloud server should learn nothing about the keyword and plaintext. We consider the cloud server as a semi-trusted or honest-but-curious party in this system. This means that the cloud server performs all the functions and tasks honestly but still curious to find out as much as possible from the operations. Table 1 shows a list of notations used for our proposed CP-DABKS scheme in this paper. The CP-DABKS scheme consists of eight polynomial-time algorithms:
The KGC runs the global parameters generation algorithm. It takes the security parameter 1 k and set of attributes U as inputs, and outputs global system parameters params and master secret key msk.
• KeyGen S (params) → (pk S , sk S ): Taking the global system parameters params as input, the sender generates its own public key pk S and private key sk S .
• KeyGen CS (params) → (pk CS , sk CS ): Taking the global system parameters params as input, the cloud server generates its own public key pk CS and private key sk CS .
• KeyGen R (params, U , msk) → (pk R , sk R , SK ): The data receiver is the user who meets the access conditions. Taking the global system parameters params, the set of attributes U , the master secret key msk as inputs, KGC outputs the public key pk R , private key sk R , and the attribute secret key SK of the data receiver.
• Encrypt((M , ρ), params, pk R , pk CS , sk S , w, m) → CT : This algorithm is run by the sender. Taking the global system parameters params, an access structure (M , ρ), the receiver's public key pk R , the cloud server's public key pk CS , the sender's private key sk S , a keyword w, a message m as inputs, the algorithm first encrypts the set of attributes with the access structure to get ciphertext ct 1 . Then, it encrypts the message m to get ciphertext ct 2 . Finally, it encrypts the keyword w to get ciphertext ct 3 , and sends the ciphertext CT = (ct 1 , ct 2 , ct 3 ) to the cloud server.
• Trapdoor(params, SK , sk R , pk S , w) → T w : Taking the global system parameters params, the server's public key pk S , the receiver's secret key sk R , the attribute secret key SK , and a keyword w as inputs, the receiver generates a trapdoor T w and sends it to the cloud server.
• Test((M , ρ) , params, T w , U , CT , sk CS ) → CT or ⊥: This algorithm is executed by the cloud server. Taking the access structure (M , ρ), the global system parameters params, the trapdoor T w , the set of attributes U , the ciphertext CT , and the cloud server's private key sk CS as inputs, the cloud server first determines if the user's attributes satisfy the access structure. If it is not satisfied, the cloud server terminates the algorithm. Otherwise, the server checks if ct 3 and T w contain the same keyword. If there is a match, the cloud server returns ciphertext CT to the receiver. Otherwise, it returns ⊥.
• Decrypt(params, CT , sk R ) → m: This algorithm is executed by the receiver. Taking the global system parameters params, the ciphertext CT , the receiver's private key sk R as inputs, the algorithm decrypts the ciphertext CT and outputs the plaintext message m.
B. SECURITY DEFINITION
In our CP-DABKS scheme, we note that the message m and the keyword w are all related to attributes, and the cloud server is semi-trusted. We must treat it as an imaginary adversary. We consider the following two types of adversary, namely outside attacker (as defined in Definition 1, and 5) and inside attacker (including cloud server) (as defined in Definition 2, 3, and 4). Game 1: The security game of CP-ABE chosen-plaintext attacks (the adversary is an outside attacker) is defined as follows:
• Initialisation: The adversary first gives an access structure (M * , ρ * ) that he wants to challenge.
• Setup: The challenger generates the system public parameters params and other correlative keys, then it sends these to the adversary.
• QueryPhase1: The adversary issues the attribute secret key query with attributes U that does not satisfy the access structure (M * , ρ * ). The challenger runs the algorithm to get the attribute secret key SK , and sends it to the adversary.
• Challenge: The adversary outputs a target pair (m * 0 , m * 1 ). When receiving these, the challenger randomly chooses a bit β ∈ {0, 1}, and sends the target ciphertext to the adversary.
• QueryPhase2: Repeat query phase 1.
• Guess: The adversary outputs the guess β . If β = β, the adversary wins the game. In Game 1, we define the advantage of the adversary by Adv CP−ABE−CPA CP−DABKS (k 1 ) = |Pr[β = β ] − 1/2|. Definition 1: If Adv CP−ABE−CPA CP−DABKS (k 1 ) is negligible, the scheme is said to be CP-ABE-CPA secure.
Game 2: In our scheme, the cloud server can access any structure during decryption process, but it cannot get information about message m.The security game of chosenplaintext attacks (the adversary is a cloud server) is defined as follows:
• Setup: The challenger generates the system public parameters params and other correlative keys, then it sends these to the adversary. The adversary generates his public and private key and sends the public key to the challenger.
• QueryPhase1:The adversary queries the ciphertext corresponding to the message m. The challenger runs the encryption algorithm to get the ciphertext and sends it to the adversary.
• Challenge: The adversary outputs a target pair (m * 0 , m * 1 ). (Neither m * 0 nor m * 1 has been queried in query phase). When receiving these, the challenger responds by choosing a random β ∈ {0, 1}, and sends the target ciphertext ct * 2 to the adversary. • QueryPhase2: Repeat query phase 1, where (m * 0 , m * 1 ) cannot be queried.
• Guess: The adversary outputs the guess β . If β = β, the adversary wins the game. In Game 2, we define the advantage of the adversary by
is negligible, the scheme is said to be IND-CPA secure.
Game 3: The security game of off-line keyword guessing attacks (the adversary is a cloud server) is defined as follows:
• Setup: The challenger generates the system public parameters params and other correlative keys. Then the challenger sends these to the adversary. The adversary generates his public and private key and sends the public key to the challenger.
• QueryPhase1: The adversary can adaptively query trapdoor T w for any keyword w. The challenger runs the trapdoor generation algorithm to get the trapdoor T w and sends it to the adversary. The adversary can adaptively query the ciphertext ct 3 for any keyword w. The challenger runs the ciphertext generation algorithm to get the ciphertext ct 3 and sends it to the adversary.
• Challenge: The adversary outputs a target pair (w * 0 , w * 1 )(Neither w * 0 nor w * 1 has been queried in query phase). When receiving these, the challenger responds by choosing a random β ∈ {0, 1}, and sends the target trapdoor T * w to the adversary. • QueryPhase2: Repeat query phase 1, where (w * 0 , w * 1 ) cannot be queried. Game 4:The security game of chosen keyword attacks (the adversary is a cloud server) is defined as follows:
When the adversary is an insider cloud server, Game 4 is similar to Game 3. The challenge phase becomes as follows: the adversary outputs a target key pair (w * 0 , w * 1 ). (Neither w * 0 nor w * 1 has been queried in query phase). When receiving these, the challenger responds by choosing a random β ∈ {0, 1}, and sends the target ciphertext ct * 3 to the adversary. Definition 5: Collusion resistance: Our scheme guarantees that users who do not satisfy the access structure cannot get relevant data by combining their trapdoors.
V. OUR CP-DABKS SCHEME A. CONSTRUCTION
Our proposed CP-DABKS scheme is constructed based on bilinear pairings. We use an LSSS (Linear Secret Sharing Scheme) matrix in the encryption to enable find-grained search and access of encrypted data. The cloud performs the search operation if a trapdoor associated with a set of attributes satisfies the access matrix associated with a ciphertext. We include the sender's private key in the generation of keyword ciphertext for protecting against KGAs. We also introduce the cloud server's public and private keys in the construction. The purpose of using cloud server's public key in the encryption of keyword is to eliminate the needs of using a secure channel for transmitting the trapdoor. This technique is used in constructing most of the SCF-PEKS schemes. The high-level interaction of our proposed CP-DABKS scheme is illustrated in Fig. 3 . We describe the construction of our proposed CP-DABKS scheme as follows.
• Setup(1 k , U ) → (params, msk): KGC runs the algorithm by taking the inputs of security parameter 1 k and set of attributes U . It sets the parameters as follows: G 1 and G 2 are two cyclic groups of prime order p, g is a generator of G 1 , e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear pairing. It randomly selects h 1 , . . . , h |U | , Q, h ∈ R G 1 , and α, a ∈ R Z * p . It selects collision-resistant hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 1 , H 2 : G 2 → G 2 . It outputs the public parameters params = (g, e(g, g) α , g a , h 1 , . . . , h |U | , Q, h, H 1 , H 2 ) and the master secret key msk = g α .
• KeyGen S (params) → (pk S , sk S ): A sender randomly selects z ∈ R Z * p , and sets the public key pk S = g z and private key sk S = z.
• KeyGen CS (params) → (pk CS , sk CS ): A cloud server randomly selects x ∈ R Z * p , and sets the public key pk CS = g x and private key sk CS = x.
• KeyGen R (params, U , msk) → (pk R , sk R , SK ): KGC randomly selects t, y ∈ R Z * p and computes K = g α g at , L = g t , K x = h t x (∀x ∈ U ). It then sends y and the attribute secret key SK = (K , L, K x ) to the receiver. The receiver sets the public key pk R = g y and private key sk R = y.
• Encrypt((M , ρ) , params, pk R , pk CS , sk S , w, m) → CT :
1) The sender sets the access structure and encrypts it. Given an access structure (M , ρ), where M is an access matrix with l rows and n columns, and the function ρ is the row attribute of M . The sender randomly chooses a vector v = {s, y 2 , . . . , y n } ∈ R Z n p , r 1 , . . . , r l ∈ R Z * p , where s is the secret value. It computes ct 1 as C = g s ,
2) The sender encrypts the message m. It randomly chooses b ∈ R Z * p , and computes message ciphertext ct 2 as
3) The sender sets a keyword index for message ciphertext ct 2 , which is actually to encrypt the keywords w. It randomly chooses r ∈ R Z * p , and computes keyword ciphertext ct 3 as C 3 = g r , C 4 = pk r R , C 5 = H 2 [e(H 1 (w) sk S h r , pk R )e(Q, pk CS ) r ]e(g, g) αs .
Finally, the sender uploads the ciphertext CT = (ct 1 , ct 2 , ct 3 ) to the cloud server.
• Trapdoor(params, SK , sk R , pk S , w) → T w : The receiver computes the trapdoor T w,1 = e(H 1 (w) sk R , pk S ), T w,2 = E pk CS (SK ) and sends the T w = (T w,1 , T w,2 ) to the cloud server. Note that when computing T w,2 , the receiver encrypts SK with the cloud server's public key.
• Test((M , ρ) , params, T w , U , CT , sk CS ) → CT : The cloud server first performs the decryption algorithm Next, the cloud server can compute
(e(C i , L)e(D i , K ρ(i) )) w i = e(g, g) αs , VOLUME 8, 2020 and compute whether
If the equation holds, the cloud server continues the following steps. Otherwise, it terminates the algorithm. Finally, the cloud server finds the document and message ciphertext ct 2 corresponding to the keyword w. It then computes
and sends CT = (ct , C 1 ) to the receiver.
• Decrypt(params, CT , sk R ) → m: The receiver decrypts the ciphertext with his/her private key by computing
to get the message m.
B. CORRECTNESS
We verify the correctness of the proposed CP-DABKS scheme as follows.
In the Test step:
i∈I (e(g aλ i h −r i ρ(i) , g t )e(g r i , h t ρ(i) )) w i = e(g, g) αs e(g, g) ast i∈I e(g, g) taλ i w i = e(g, g) αs e(g, g) ast e(g, g) ast = e(g, g) αs (1) and
In the Decrypt step:
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we demonstrate the security of our proposed CP-DABKS scheme. Theorem 1: If the q-parallel BDHE problem is intractable, our scheme is CP-ABE-CPA secure in Game 1.
Proof: Before the game starts, the adversary A outputs an access structure (M * , ρ * ) that it wants to challenge, where M * is an access matrix with l * rows and n * columns, and the function ρ * (i) is the row attribute of M * . • Setup. The challenger B parameterizes attribute setting as follows: G 1 and G 2 are two cyclic groups of prime order p and e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear pairing. B is given q-parallel BDHE problem ( y, Z ), its goal is to decide whether Z = e(g, g) a q+1 s . B randomly selects Q, pk R ∈ G 1 , α ∈ R Z * p , and lets e(g a , g a q )e(g, g) α = e(g, g) α , where the implicit assumption is α = α +a q+1 . Next, B arranges the group element h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h |U | in the following way: For every x(1 ≤ x ≤ |U |), it selects a corresponding random number z x . X is the set of indicators i for ρ * (i) = x. Since g z x is a random element,
• QueryPhase1. The adversary A issues an attribute secret key query with set of attributes U that does not satisfy access structure (M * , ρ). The challenger B randomly selects r 0 ∈ R Z * p , and solves w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w * n ) ∈ R Z n * p , where w 1 = −1 and wM * i = 0 (ρ * (i) ∈ U ). According to the LSSS structure, the vector must exist, otherwise the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) is in the
the implicit assumption is t = r 0 + w 1 a q + w 2 a q−1 + w n * a q−n * +1 , then g at contains g −a q+1 . By constructing
Otherwise, there are many i that meet ρ * (i) = x(x ∈ U ). We let X represents the set of indicators i that makes ρ * (i) = x(x ∈ U ), then
• Challenge. The adversary A submits two plaintext m * 0 , m * 1 . The challenger B randomly selects b ∈ R Z * p , β ∈ R {0, 1}, and computes C * 1 = g b , C * 2 = m β Ze(g, g) αs H 2 (e(Q, pk R ) b , C * = g s . When computing (C * i , D * i ), it randomly selects y 2 , . . . , y n * , r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r l ∈ R Z * p , and uses the vector v = (s, sa + y 2 , . . . , sa n−1 + y n * ) ∈ R Z n * p to divide the secret value s. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n * , it defines that R i is a set that satisfies ρ * (i) = ρ * (k)(k = i) for all k. The challenge
(g a j s(b i /b k ) ) M * k,j ) and D * i = g r i g −sb i . Finally, B sends ct * 1 , ct * 2 to A. • QueryPhase2.Repeat query phase 1. • Guess. The adversary A outputs the guess β . If β = β, A can win. The challenger B can solve q-parallel BDHE problem based on its guess. Refer to [38] , Adv CP−ABE−CPA CP−DABKS (k 1 ) has a negligible advantage. Theorem 1 is proved.
Theorem 2: If the CBDH problem is intractable, our scheme is IND-CPA secure in Game 2.
Proof: Given message ciphertext ct 2 of
When the adversary is a cloud server, e(g, g) αs can be calculated by the cloud server. In order to simplify the process, we change the attack goal of adversary to C 2 = mH 2 [e(Q, pk R ) b ]. The proof process is as follows.
• Setup. The challenger B inputs a CBDH problem (g, g x , g y , g z ), its goal is to compute e(g, g) xyz . B selects two cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order p, a bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , and lets Q = g y , pk R = g z . Then, B sends params, pk R to A. Proof: If the adversary is a cloud server, the trapdoor in query phase and challenge phase becomes T w,1 , while ignoring T w,2 . The reason is that the access structure is available to the cloud server. We show the proof as follows.
• Setup. The challenger B inputs a DBDH problem (g, g x , g y , g z , Z ), its goal is to decide whether Z = e(g, g) xyz . B selects two cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order p and a bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , and sends pk R = g x , pk S = g y to the adversary A. A generates pk CS , sk CS , and sends pk CS to B.
• QueryPhase1. The adversary A first queries the random oracle H 1 . The challenger B randomly selects a i ∈ R Z p , and c i ∈ R {0, 1}. If c i = 0, it sets P r [c i = 0] = σ and h i = g z g a i . Otherwise, it sets P r [c i = 1] = 1−σ and h i = g a i . Then B adds the tuple (w i , h i , a i , c i ) into a list H list 1 (which is initially empty), and returns H list 1 (w i ) = h i as the hash value of w i to A. The adversary A queries the trapdoor T w i corresponding to the keyword w i . B retrieves the H list 1 , if c i = 0, it aborts the process. Otherwise, it sends T w i ,1 = e(pk R , pk S ) a i = e(H 1 (w i ), pk S ) sk R to A. The adversary A queries the ciphertext corresponding to the keyword w i . B retrieves the H list 1 , if c i = 0, it aborts the process. Otherwise, it randomly selects r i ∈ R Z * p , and sends C 3 = g r i , C 4 = pk r i R , C 5 = H 2 [e(pk a i S h r i , pk R )e(Q, pk CS ) r i ] to A. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we omit e(g, g) αs in C 5 for simplicity as it can be computed by the cloud server.
• Challenge. The adversary A submits two keywords w * 0 , w * 1 , where w * 0 , w * 1 have not been queried in trapdoor and ciphertext query phases. B retrieves the tuples (w * 0 , h * 0 , a * 0 , c * 0 ) and (w * 1 , h * 1 , a * 1 , c * 1 ) from the list H list 1 . If c * 0 = c * 1 = 1, it terminates the process and randomly outputs its guess. If c * 0 or c * 1 = 1, B randomly selects w * b ∈ R {w * 0 , w * 1 }, and computes the trapdoor T w * b ,1 = Ze(g x , g y ) a * b . If the Z = e(g, g) xyz , T w * b ,1 = Ze(g x , g y ) a * b = e(g, g) xy(z+a * b )
= e(H 1 (w * b ) sk R , pk S ). Otherwise, T w * b is randomly distributed. B sends T w * b to A.
• QueryPhase2. Repeat query phase 1, except asking for trapdoors or ciphertexts corresponding to w * 0 , w * 1 . • Guess. The adversary A outputs the guess β . If β = β, A wins the game. The challenger B can solve the DBDH problem based on its guess.
Refer to [28] , Adv IND−KGA CP−DABKS (k 3 ) has a negligible advantage. Theorem 3 is proved.
Theorem 4: If the DDDH problem is intractable, our scheme is IND-CKA secure in Game 4.
Proof: If the adversary is a cloud server, e(g, g) αs can be calculated by the cloud server. We change the attack goal to ct 3 : C 3 = g r , C 4 = pk r R , C 5 = H 2 [e(H 1 (w) sk S h r , g α )e(Q, pk CS ) r ]. We show the proof as follows.
• Setup. The challenger B inputs a DDDH problem (g, g y , g s/y , Z ), its goal is to decide whether Z = g s . B selects two cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order p and a bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , and randomly selects x, y ∈ R Z p . B sets the sender's public key g x ∈ R G 2 and pk S = g y , then sends pk S , pk R to A, where the implicit assumption is sk S = y, sk R = x. The adversary A generates pk CS , sk CS , and sends pk CS to B.
• QueryPhase1. The adversary A first queries the random oracle H 1 . The challenger B randomly selects a i ∈ R Z * p , and c i ∈ R {0, 1}. If c i = 0, B sets P r [c i = 0] = σ and h i = g s/y g a i . Otherwise, it sets P r [c i = 1] = 1 − σ and h i = g a i . Then B adds the tuple (w i , h i , a i , c i )
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a secure-channel free ciphertextpolicy decryptable attribute-based keyword search scheme that can resist chosen plaintext attack, chosen keyword attack and inside off-line keyword guessing attack. In our scheme, we associate the LSSS access policy with keywords and plaintext message, which ensure that only users with specific attributes can retrieve encrypted data on cloud platform. Furthermore, our scheme does not need a secure channel for trapdoor transmission. Our scheme can be applied to facilitate secure sharing and fine-grained searching on encrypted EHRs on eHealth cloud platforms.
